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Abstract
This article analyses the impact of state decentralization on one aspect of terri-
torial diversity, specifically on the policy discretion of regions, as an expression of 
their political autonomy for self-government. Our interest focuses on the factors that 
determine the decisions and actions of regional governments in developing their pol-
icies. We ask: why do regional governments take different public policy options? Conced-
ing that several factors help explain policy decisions (such as productive structure, 
government ideology, social capital, political context, budgetary resources), we choose 
to explore the impact of two of them, by asking: in what way, and to what extent, are 
policy decisions and actions conditioned by the financing model and by their different ide-
ologies? We present quantitative and qualitative comparative evidence from two con-
trasting case studies: two regions in decentralized Spain that have developed their 
own policies of income and spending, and have translated them into differing public 
management policies and regulatory models for providing health services. These gov-
ernments are ideologically different and have undergone different degrees of recent 
ideological changes, but the resources provided to them by the financing model have 
also been different. We show how resources determine the scope of governments’ 
actions, while ideology determines their direction.
Keywords
Decentralization; public policy; ideology; territorial financing system; Spain; 
health system.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el impacto de la descentralización del Estado en un aspecto 
de la diversidad territorial, concretamente en la discrecionalidad de las políticas públi-
cas regionales, como una expresión de su autonomía política para el autogobierno. 
Nuestro interés se centra en los factores que determinan las decisiones y acciones de 
los Gobiernos subcentrales en el desarrollo de sus políticas públicas. Nos pregunta-
mos: ¿por qué los Gobiernos regionales toman diferentes opciones de políticas públi-
cas? Asumiendo que son diversos factores los que ayudan a explicar las decisiones de 
políticas públicas (tales como la estructura productiva, la ideología del Gobierno, el 
capital social, el contexto político, los recursos presupuestarios…), escogemos explo-
rar el impacto de dos de ellos, preguntándonos: ¿de qué forma, y en qué medida, sus 
decisiones de políticas y acciones de políticas públicas han sido condicionadas por el 
modelo de financiación y por sus diferentes ideologías? Presentamos evidencia com-
parativa, cualitativa y cuantitativa de dos estudios de caso: dos comunidades autóno-
mas en España que han desarrollado sus propias políticas de ingresos y de gasto, y las 
han traducido en políticas de gestión pública y modelos regulativos de los servicios de 
salud distintos. No solo sus Gobiernos han sido ideológicamente distintos y han 
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pasado por diferentes grados de cambios ideológicos, sino que también los recursos 
que se les han asignado a través del modelo de financiación han sido distintos. Mos-
tramos cómo los recursos determinan el alcance de las acciones de los Gobiernos, 
mientras que su ideología determina su dirección.
Palabras clave
Descentralización; políticas públicas; ideología; financiación territorial; España; 
sistema sanitario.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of decentralization in States is a major issue in comparative lit-
erature from various disciplines, mainly due to the diversity of social, economic 
and political impacts that this process may have across the territory. Hence, 
most of these studies focus on the potential inequalities that may occur between 
regions (McEwen and Moreno, 2005; Gallego, 2016; Gallego, 2014; Guillén 
and León, 2011; Rodríguez-Pose, 2004). However, in this article, we start from 
the basis that the States are, in fact, geographically diverse in their political, eco-
nomic and social conditions and that this holds true whether they are unitary or 
decentralized. Therefore, we understand that decentralization will have different 
impacts on different territories because these are, to begin with, different. That 
is, even supposing that the powers and decentralized resources are equivalent in 
the different territories of a State, their governments will deploy actions in dif-
ferent political, social and economic contexts, so it is expected that the content 
and outcome of their performances will also be different. 
In this regard, our research interest is the impact of decentralization on one 
aspect of territorial diversity, specifically on the self-government policy discre-
tion of territories, i.e. on the political autonomy of sub-central governments to 
make their own policy decisions. But what are the factors that condition the 
margin for policy discretion of these governments as an expression of their 
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political autonomy? The literature has explored several factors that condition 
policy discretion, such as productive structure, social capital, political culture, 
government ideology, social capital, political context, budgetary resources, pre-
vious policy paths… However, a dichotomy has arisen from the political debate 
in decentralized States, focusing on two such factors: to what extent are sub-cen-
tral governments limited in their autonomy by the models of territorial financ-
ing, or to what extent do the factors of political will and ideological orientation 
of those governments primarily determine the direction and scope of their deci-
sions and action? Also, in the academic debate, these same main determinants 
of the discretion to govern have been identified and explored: the budgetary 
resources available, on the one hand, and the ideology of the political forces in 
the government in question, on the other. The influence of resource allocation 
between levels of government has been studied by the normative principles of 
fiscal federalism, and the impact of ideology in government decisions has been 
one of the centres of interest in the literature on public policy.
This research uses these approaches to focus on the experience of decen-
tralization in Spain, where this debate is particularly intense both in political 
and academic venues, and which may shed light for further comparisons with 
other decentralized or federal States. Numerous studies have found that, 
although located in a common legal and institutional framework, the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities (AC) have expressed their capacity of self-govern-
ment by taking different public policy options. Since their creation in the early 
80s, the AC have played an essential role as legislators and managers of complex 
systems of welfare services for citizens. Thus, within their margin of auton-
omy, the regional governments have developed their own policies of income 
and spending that have enabled them to develop public management policies 
that have produced differing models of regulation and service provision (Gal-
lego et al., 2005; Gallego and Subirats, 2011, 2012; Moreno, 2009). There-
fore, we ask: Why have regional governments taken different public policy 
options? In what way, and to what extent, were their policy decisions and 
actions conditioned by the financing model and by their different ideologies?
To explore this question, we have selected two AC —Catalonia and 
Andalusia— which are contrasted, among other things, by the options that 
they have developed for their healthcare models. Healthcare is the budgetary 
sector with greatest weight in the hands of regional governments (they spend 
more than a third of their budgets on it), being an essential element of their 
respective welfare systems. While these AC show similarity in relation to 
their political and normative discourses on the right to healthcare and in rela-
tion to the levels achieved regarding the extent and intensity of health cover-
age, numerous studies show that the contrasts are profound if we look at the 
models for the governance and management in the provision of health 
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services: Andalusia reinforced and deployed a system of direct public provi-
sion based on an integrated hierarchical model, being built on the model of 
the structures transferred by the central government; Catalonia set up and 
consolidated a model of indirect public provision added to the structures of 
the integrated model transferred by the central government, and which has 
been based on a contractual network in which the diversity of the legal nature 
of providers prevails, as well as the interrelationship between public and pri-
vate healthcare activity. These options for different models of healthcare gov-
ernance were initially developed under governments of political continuity for 
more than two decades in both cases: the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party 
(PSOE) in Andalusia since the first regional elections of 1983 and the cen-
tre-right, nationalist Convergència i Unió (CiU) in Catalonia from 1980 to 
2003. Moreover, these developments have been accompanied by controversy 
over the territorial financing model and its impact on the political autonomy 
of the ACs, which has always been present in the general political debate.
Given this scenario, our study focuses on the first decade of the 2000s, 
during which we observe decisions by the Andalusian and Catalan regional gov-
ernments involving changes of direction in their healthcare governance policies. 
In Catalonia, after more than two decades of consensus on the impossibility of 
reforming the Catalan Institute of Health (that is, the set of structures for inte-
grated, direct service provision, transferred by the central government), a law 
was negotiated and approved that transformed it into a public company. In 
Andalusia the option of transforming the Andalusian Health Service into a pub-
lic company was rejected and, on the other hand, a network of High Resolution 
Hospital Centres was developed, with different management formulas and 
which was external to the prevalent integrated model. Looking at the financ-
ing-ideology dichotomy, in both cases, these decisions were made in a context 
that was expansive in various ways. In late 2001, the transfers of powers to all 
regions, including healthcare, were completed, although Andalusia and Catalo-
nia had already had this since the early 80s; and the territorial financing model 
was modified so that the ACs would increase their resources and earmarking 
would be eliminated. In addition, the economic environment was upward; 
therefore, decisions during that decade were not a reaction to the changing eco-
nomic cycle. In Andalusia such decisions began to be taken prior to 2001 and 
under continuity of the PSOE in the regional government. In Catalonia such 
decisions began after the elections of 2003, after an ideological shift in govern-
ment —namely, by a coalition government of pro-independence forces and left-
wing catalanist forces representing the first ideological shift in the Catalan 
government since 1980. All this gives us a path of broad contrasts and allows us 
to ask: How can we explain these decisions, again disparate, in the policies of 
public healthcare management of Andalusia and Catalonia? Are the decisions 
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being made highly conditioned by the territorial financing system? Or are they 
the result of ideological options arising from the exercise of self-government? 
This paper addresses these questions by contributing new evidence to the 
intense debate around the impact of these two variables on the political auton-
omy of regions in Spain. To do so, it provides a detailed analysis of updated, 
empirical data that include, on the one hand, the official data on the public 
resources available to the two ACs being analysed (income coming not only from 
the territorial financing model, but also from outside it –namely, income deci-
sions by the regional governments themselves), as well as data on their spending 
decisions. On the other hand, the data analysed include official documents and 
semi-structured interviews to 20 key officials who either participated in the deci-
sional processes analysed or have expert knowledge about them. The position 
and number of the interviewees were: senior politicians of the Catalan and Anda-
lusian governments (9), public management and healthcare sector professionals 
(5), trade union representatives (2), members of non-profit organizations (2) and 
academic researchers (2). The guidelines of the interviews include the following 
general topics: characteristics of the health policy sector in both AC, availability 
and constraints in budgetary resources, intergovernmental relationships and key 
decisions in health public management (particularly about the Catalan Institute 
of Health and the network of High Resolution Hospital Centres in Andalusia). 
In this paper we present, first, the theories of reference for this approach 
–fiscal federalism and policy analysis. Second, we analyse the availability of budg-
etary resources of Andalusia and Catalonia, distinguishing their volume and ori-
gin (internal or external to funding model, and tax collection or grants), together 
with its implications. Third, we explore the influence of the ideology of the polit-
ical forces in power in each region in order, fourthly, to make a joint interpreta-
tion of both cases. We rely on the analytic dialogue between theory and empirical 
data to then generate an interpretation of the two selected cases. We integrate the 
interpretation of the influence of both factors —financing and ideology— in 
these cases, to finally present the findings. Understanding the elements that con-
dition the decision-making processes at these levels of government and, there-
fore, the nature of their political autonomy, can contribute to comparative 
knowledge and debate about the operation and functionality of decentralization.
II. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND POLICY ANALYSIS: THE THEORY OF 
REFERENCE
How has the need to decentralize revenue-raising capacity and expenditure 
of the central government to sub-central governments been argued? The “Oates 
decentralization theorem” (1972) may be considered the starting point of the 
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theory of fiscal federalism, showing that the diversified supply of public goods 
by sub-central governments provides more welfare (more efficiency) than the 
uniform supply by a single government, to the extent that a better adjustment 
of supply to the preferences and needs of each territory occurs. Therefore, the 
heterogeneity of preferences is one of the main arguments that justify the exist-
ence of sub-central governments. The same argument is applied to healthcare, a 
decentralized function in many States. Therefore, different decisions about the 
provision of this service would have positive effects on the efficiency, according 
to the principles of Oates, but could have negative effects on the degree of 
inter-regional equity, which should be considered (Ayala et al., 2013). 
From this point, the question arises: On what criteria should design models 
for territorial funding be based? According to the main principles of fiscal feder-
alism, the financing model for sub-central government must reconcile the  exercise 
of financial autonomy with a “certain” principle of equity. Thus, revenue sharing 
must meet the following principles: a) Financial autonomy: all governments 
should be able to take decisions both on spending (how much and on what they 
spend) as on income (how much and from where they get their resources). This 
is only possible if funding is largely not earmarked and comes from own taxes; b) 
Vertical balance: the different levels of government should have the same degree 
of coverage of their spending needs; c) Horizontal equity: governments that are 
part of the same level must have an equal or similar volume of resources to meet 
their spending responsibilities, asking the same tax effort of their citizens; d) 
Other principles are transparency, coordination and institutional loyalty.
If the governments of Andalusia and Catalonia have made different deci-
sions in relation to the provision of healthcare, this may be due to at least two 
reasons. One, the regional governments have provided these services expressing 
heterogeneous preferences for health output between AC (which supposedly 
represent the citizens who voted for them) towards a greater collective welfare. 
Two, the different behaviour of regional governments could be due to the char-
acteristics of the financing model and its results, mainly the available per capita 
resources, their origin and the decisions that have been taken on them.
In the Spanish case, these options are raised within an institutional 
framework that is consistent for all regions in certain aspects, such as: the scope 
of the basic legislation, invasive (or not) effect of the doctrine of the Consti-
tutional Court, the control period of the central administrative unit on the 
regional territory, the administrative scope or extent of earmarked financing 
condition the degree of the sub-central government policy autonomy. In this 
context, key areas of the Welfare State are decentralized to the AC, but framed 
in equal rights and market unity. That is, the relevance of the various prefer-
ences and territorial needs is recognized, but the ultimate responsibility for 
the provision is preserved by the higher level of government.
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However, from the examination of public policies, other factors are 
included in the analysis that also influence the development of policies and 
explain that, even within similar institutional frameworks, sub-central govern-
ments make decisions on different public policies. Thus, the ideology of the 
political forces in power not only results in the construction of a discourse sup-
porting government decisions, but also a priori steers the direction of public 
policy. The ideology implies a certain identification and definition of the issues 
to be addressed, bringing a preference for a certain intensity, extent and type of 
intervention in such issues, and supports the proposal of a particular model of 
relationship between the external stakeholders and government institutions. 
Another factor influencing government action is the nature of the public 
policy sector in question. This includes, inter alia: the relative weight of pub-
lic and private provision, management tools used, the characteristics of the sec-
tor actors that influence policy making, as well as the type of interaction these 
have with the political actors. Although these features have a certain structural 
base, they are also factors that typically become an implicit or explicit object of 
intervention and modification by government action. Finally, all this unfolds in 
the context of dynamic contextual aspects of economic, political and social 
types - both specific for the territory and relevant in a relationship of multilevel 
governance. Thus, the analysis of capacity constraints and government action 
necessarily integrates all these factors (financing, ideology and structural and 
relational characteristics) in the interpretation of the political process. 
III. THE REGIONAL FINANCING MODEL: SAME BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS FOR ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA?
In the 2000s, the governments of Andalusia and Catalonia took different 
decisions regarding healthcare. We look at whether these differences can be 
explained by the characteristics of the financing model. We assume that the 
model and its evolution have a significant explanatory weight in the political 
decision-making capacity of regional governments (Vilalta, 2005, 2007; Bosch 
and Duran, 2008; Bosch and Vilalta, 2008; Ruiz-Huerta et al., 2010) but we 
want to investigate how and to what extent this influence occurs. So we ask: 
How does the financing model distribute resources between these territories? 
Have Andalusia and Catalonia had the same per capita budget? What part of 
the budgets of the Andalusian and Catalan governments comes from the 
regional financing model and how much comes from other sources (debt, etc.)? 
In accordance with the stated principles of fiscal federalism, we can affirm 
that the agreed models described below are characterized by: a lack of financial 
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autonomy; a lack of global resources to address spending responsibilities; erratic 
and unjustifiable results according to the principle of horizontal equity.
1. THE AVAILABILITY AND SOURCE OF RESOURCES DURING THE PERIOD 
2001-2011: ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA 
OBSERVED?
Andalusia and Catalonia have received resources from the so-called 
model of financing for the autonomous communities from the common 
regime. This model has been designed over the last 30 years, the result of suc-
cessive agreements of the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF). 
These agreements have been, once the initial stage of transitional funding 
(1980-1986) had passed, fortnightly. This was so until 2001, when the model 
was stopped. However, the new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, approved 
in 2006, opened a new negotiation model which was generalized for all the 
AC in 2009 (that of Andalusia was reformed in 2007 and in regard to the reg-
ulation of the financing model, the text is virtually identical to that of Cata-
lonia). Below we describe the operation and the results of agreed models in 
2001 and 2009, in force during the period of analysis of this paper.
1.1. Regional financing agreements of 2001 and 2009
Catalonia assumes competence in healthcare in 1981 and Andalusia in 
1984. Until 2001, only five other autonomous communities had assumed this 
competence (Andalusia, Galicia and Valencia), as a part of the charter. To 
finance it, they received a specific grant that for Catalonia was an annual median 
of 715 euros per capita for the years 1999-2001, and 700 for Andalusia. In 
2001, competencies on healthcare was transferred to the other autonomous 
communities and their financing was integrated into the overall model. All 
resources will be unconditioned, none of them will have a specific destination.
1.2. The financing agreement of 2001
The regional financing model approved in 2001 was designed around 
two major ways of obtaining revenue: a) the ceded taxes and b) the equaliza-
tion grant named “sufficiency fund”.
a) Ceded taxes
The taxes in the regional governments were: the wealth tax, the gift and 
inheritance tax, the capital transfers tax, the stamp duty tax, the gambling tax 
33 % of personal income tax , 35 % of value added tax (VAT), 40 % of excise 
duties (tobacco, alcohol and hydrocarbons), the special excise tax on certain 
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means of transport, excise duty on electricity, and the excise tax on retail sales 
of certain hydrocarbons. The first five of these are known by the name of tra-
ditional ceded taxes as they were part of the tax basket of regional govern-
ments since the early 80s.
From the beginning, the State transferred the income from taxes, and 
only in some cases, their management and administration. It would not be 
until 1996 and especially since the 2001 agreement, when it began also to give 
some regulatory capacity. Since then, the regional governments have been able 
to make decisions on certain elements of the following taxes: the aforemen-
tioned traditional taxes, income tax, the excise tax on certain means of trans-
port and the excise tax on retail sales of certain hydrocarbons1. 
Ceded taxes is complemented by the so-called own taxes. Regional govern-
ments can create tax figures provided they do not reflect taxable events already 
recorded by the central government. This has been used to establish taxes that, in 
general terms, either have an environmental objective or fall on gaming. The AC 
have used this possibility with different intensity. Catalonia has been a very active 
community in the creation of own taxes. On the other hand, the application of 
these tax forms has often led to legal conflict with the central government.
b) The equalization grant: The sufficiency fund
The AC receive a grant called the sufficiency fund. The distribution of the 
fund is carried out based on expenditure needs. To quantify them a set of varia-
bles (population, area, scatter, relative income, population over 65 years, insu-
larity) is used, and specific funds, guarantees and modulation rules are organized2. 
Table 1 shows the result of the model financing agreement in its first and 
last year of validity. The differences between Catalonia and Andalusia fall both 
in the volume of per capita resources provided by the model, and in its origin. 
In 2008, the model brings to Catalonia 81 euros per capita less than that 
received by Andalusia. In Catalonia, 88 % of resources come from ceded taxes, 
however, in Andalusia, this percentage is 55 %. The weight of the sufficiency 
fund is therefore greater in Andalusia than in Catalonia.
1.3. The financing agreement of 2009
The model agreed in 2009 includes three income methods: a) Ceded 
taxes; b) An equalization mechanism; c) The adjustment funds.
1 For a detailed explanation of the regulatory power of the AC on each of the tax, see 
Bassols et al. (2010: 9-12, 31-35).
2 For more detail, see Gallego (2014: 38-42).
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a) Ceded taxes
Compared to the previous model, the percentages of assignment of the 
main tax types are extended: the personal income tax from 33 % to 50 %; 
VAT from 35 % to 50 % and excise taxes from 40 % to 58 %. 
b) The equalization mechanism
To comply with the principle of equity, an equalization grant is made up, 
called the “guarantee fund for basic public services” (FGSPF). The aim is 
to ensure that each region receives the same resources per capita (adjusted) to 
fund essential services of the Welfare State (education, health and social ser-
vices), undertaking the same tax effort3. As shown in column 2 of Table 2, 
there are regions that are providers to the FGSPF (e.g. Catalonia) and others 
that are receivers (e.g. Andalusia). In 2011, Catalonia contributed 1,020 mil-
lion euros to this fund and Andalusia received 3,556. 
c) The adjustment funds of the model
The model contains three further funds that deviate from the objective 
of equalization corresponding to the FGSPF. They are funds derived from 
political negotiation and the implicit aim of maintaining the status quo, 
despite the change of model. 
Table 2 also shows the final result of applying the funding model in 
2011. The ceded taxes provided Catalonia 17,578 million euros and 13,173 
million euros for Andalusia. If to this amount are added and/or subtracted 
funds of the model (the FGSPF and the three adjustment funds), Catalonia 
ends up receiving 19,076 million euros and Andalusia 18,653 million euros. 
In euros per inhabitant expressed as an index it stands at 99 for Catalonia and 
at 94 for Andalusia.
Finally, if the development of resources from the financing model over the 
analysed period is observed, it can be seen that the 2001 model always provided 
more resources per capita to Andalusia than to Catalonia, however, starting 
from the 2009 agreement, receipts per capita for Andalusia are lower than those 
for Catalonia (see Figure 1 in Annex). This shows that in the last agreed model, 
the government that has a higher fiscal capacity (higher tax bases) will have 
more resources per capita than the one that has a lower fiscal capacity. Which is 
consistent with a partial equalization mechanism (Boadway and Flatters, 1982).
3 For more detail, see Bassols et al. (2010: 37-38).
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Table 2. Resources from the funding model. Liquidation 2011. Millions €
Ceded 
taxes FGSPF
Adjustment 
funds Total €/inhab. Index
Catalonia 17.578 -1.020 2.518 19.076 2.243 99
Galicia 4.987 1.087 1.192 7.267 2.504 111
Andalusia 13.173 3.556 1.924 18.653 2.120 94
Asturias 2.257 134 421 2.812 2.542 113
Cantabria 1.328 -33 482 1.778 2.807 124
La Rioja 652 46 229 927 2.724 121
Murcia 2.403 537 165 3.106 2.102 93
Valencia 9.387 1.147 559 11.093 2.113 94
Aragon 3.020 40 550 3.610 2.626 116
Castile La Mancha 3.537 958 453 4.948 2.334 103
Canaries 1.758 2.264 454 4.476 1.992 88
Extremadura 1.654 657 563 2.874 2.585 115
Balearics 2.651 -179 160 2.632 2.275 101
Madrid 17.041 -2.794 647 14.894 2.154 95
Castile and Leon 5.081 651 996 6.727 2.625 116
Total 86.506 7.053 11.314 104.873 2.257 100
Source: The autors based on the Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, INE.
However, we must clarify that this set of tax revenues provided by the 
model does not include the tax collection effects due to the use that the AC 
can make of available regulatory capacity on the different ceded taxes, both to 
reduce and to increase them. In this sense, the central regulation of assigned 
taxes acts as a subsidiary, i.e. if the autonomous community does not regulate 
them, it will obtain revenues as if it applied central regulations4. 
Table 3 shows how the trend has been in the use of the regulatory capacity 
on the main ceded taxes by the AC throughout the period. Although this use of 
the regulatory capacity has effects in collection that are difficult to quantify, the 
impact column tries to show some evidence on the magnitude of these effects.
4 However, from 2011, if an autonomous community does not approve the regional 
rate of income tax, the subsidiary central rate is not applicable but rather there arises 
a situation of absence of regional tax and of the regional tax receipts. This measure was 
intended to encourage the responsibility of regional governments when taking and 
updating their fiscal decisions and also to be accountable to their contributors.
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2. BEYOND THE RESOURCES FROM THE FUNDING MODEL
Not all regional government revenues come from the funding model. 
There are others, such as: public fees and charges; income from the use or sale 
of public assets; transfers of private companies, the European Union or also 
the central government, which are not part of the model; financial operations. 
In Andalusia the weight of resources coming from the model in relation to 
total income is higher than in Catalonia: 62 % vs. 59 % (average 2002/08) 
and 55 % vs. 49 % (average 2009/11). 
While per capita resources from model have been, during the years 2001-
2008, higher in Andalusia than in Catalonia, in the end both regions end up hav-
ing a similar volume of total resources per inhabitant. Catalonia has had to find, 
then, a greater share of its income from outside the model (see Figure 2 in Annex).
Table 4 shows the behaviour of the sources of income from outside the 
funding model. The main differences are observed in: i) Financial transactions: 
Catalonia has borrowed more than Andalucía (an annual average of 588.79 
euros per inhabitant and 232.93, respectively) during the period 2002-2011; ii) 
transfers or grants: Andalusia has received more grants than Catalonia (an 
annual average per capita of 598.33 euros and 334.86, respectively). When a 
large part of a government’s income comes from grants, this may have undesir-
able effects, linked to the existence of a “fiscal illusion”, that is, the non-percep-
tion by citizens of the true “cost” of services which they receive from their 
government (see Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Lago, 2002; Esteller, 2005).
Table 4. Income sources out of the funding model.  
Average 2002-2011. € per inhabitant
Andalusia Catalonia
€ 
inhabitant %
€ 
inhabitant %
User fees, public prices, special taxes 82,28 8,8% 103,00 9,9%
Income assets 14,20 1,5% 3,18 0,3%
Sale of real investments 3,50 0,4% 5,54 0,5%
Transfers* 598,33 64,3% 334,86 32,3%
Financial operations 232,93 25,0% 588,79 56,9%
Total revenue "outside the model" 931,23 100,0% 1.035,36 100,0%
Total revenue 3.458,00 371,3% 3.662,00 353,7%
*  Transfers from central government (out of model), from privat firms and non-profit insti-
tutions, and from outside the country.
Source: The autors based on the Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, INE.
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IV. HEALTH POLICY DECISIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA: 
THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY?
Regarding the influence of ideology as a conditioning factor of govern-
ment capacity we ask, for the decade under investigation: What was the per 
capita health budget in Andalusia and Catalonia? How have these autono-
mous communities structured their health spending? What model of service 
delivery and management has been developed in each?
1. MANAGING THE BUDGET: SPENDING DECISIONS AS POLICY 
DECISIONS
Health expenditure per capita has generally increased over the period 
although a change in trend is observed as from 2008 (see Figure 3 in Annex). 
Several authors relate this increase to the decentralization of healthcare referring 
to aspects such as: competition between AC, the possible increase of prices of 
factors due to fragmentation of purchasing power, the existence of interest 
groups with great regional power, or export of innovation processes and meas-
ures to other communities that may ultimately mean more costs (Costa-Font 
and Pons-Novell, 2007; Cantarero and Lago, 2010; Urbanos, 2006). In 2011, 
national average per capita healthcare expenditure stands at 1,322 euros, much 
like that of Catalonia (1,342) and above that of Andalusia (1,121). 
Regarding the economic nature of healthcare spending by the commu-
nities (Table 5), the difference is observed in the model of provision of health-
care between Andalusia and Catalonia. In the case of Andalusia, the component 
with greater weight is staff remuneration (47 %-49 %) followed by current 
transfers (24 %-24 %), and intermediate consumption - materials, supplies, 
etc. (21 %-20 %). In Catalonia, in the period 2002/08, expenditure on pur-
chases from the private sector through special agreements have the most 
weight (33 %), followed by remuneration of staff (28 %) and current transfers 
(22 %). Although the weight of the private sector agreements decreases in the 
following period, we can say that the figures reflect the presence of a large 
number of private providers in the Catalan model.
The quantitative importance of the section on “current transfers” that 
includes mainly expenditure for pharmaceutical services should also be high-
lighted5. These costs represent the average for the period 2009/2011: 280 euro 
per capita in Andalusia and 255 per capita in Catalonia.
5 The concept of current transfers mainly reflects spending on prescriptions and 
reimbursements for prostheses and therapeutic devices.
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Table 5. Health public expenditure. Economic nature
Andalusia Catalonia
2002/08 2009/11 2002/08 2009/11
Staff remuneration 47% 49% 28% 36%
Intermediate consumption 21% 20% 14% 18%
Agreements 5% 5% 33% 24%
Current transfers 24% 24% 22% 18%
Capital costs 3% 2% 3% 3%
Consumption of fixed capital 0% 0% 0% 1%
Total health public expenditure 100 100 100 100
Source: the autors based on Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad. 
Table 6 gives us an approximate idea of the strategic direction of healthcare 
policy in each community. As can be seen, more than half of healthcare expend-
iture in the communities is intended for “hospital and specialized care”, the sec-
ond function in order of importance is spending for “pharmacy”, despite the 
decline that this has recorded in its share of the total between 2002 and 2011.
Table 6. Health public expenditure. Functional classification
Andalusia Catalonia
2002 2011 2002 2011
Hospital and specialist services 53% 57% 53% 60%
Primary care 17% 17% 15% 14%
Public care services 0% 0% 0% 1%
Collective care services 1% 1% 4% 3%
Pharmaceuticals 25% 21% 24% 17%
Moving, prothesis & 
therapeutic aparatus
2% 2% 2% 3%
Capital costs 2% 1% 2% 3%
Total health public expenditure 100 100 100 100
Source: The autors based on Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad.
150 R. GALLEGO, N. BARBIERI, C. DE GISPERT, S. GONZÁLEZ y M. VILALTA
Revista de Estudios Políticos, 180, abril-junio (2018), pp. 131-162
In Catalonia, the costs associated with hospital and specialist services 
have gone from 53 % (2002) to 60 % (2011), a figure which represents 802 
euros per capita, above the 643 per capita in the case of Andalusia. Likewise, 
the relative weight of spending on primary care has suffered slight variation 
in the analysed period representing in 2011: 193 euros per capita in Andalusia 
and 182 in Catalonia. 
2. CHANGING HEALTH PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: WHY AND HOW? 
2.1. Catalonia: Formulating the Law of the Catalan Health Institute
The trajectory of the health policy in Catalonia over the last two dec-
ades of the 20th Century has been widely analyzed (Gallego, 2000, 2016). 
Catalonia was the first Autonomous Community to receive the health pol-
icy competencies in 1981, at the onset of the devolution process. The public 
providers transferred by the Spanish government to the Catalan government 
were all integrated into a single organization —the Catalan Health Institute 
(ICS)—, preserving and replicating the Spanish direct public provision. 
These providers amounted to over 90 per cent of primary care providers in 
Catalonia, but only to a third of the hospital beds at that time, which left 
scope for contracts with external providers to play a prominent role. In this 
scenario, the Catalan government gradually consolidated a contract-based 
health provision system that built on pre-existing private (both profit and 
non-profit) and public providers, most of which required considerable 
investment to become technically and economically viable. Building on 
them, the Catalan health system developed an extensive, publicly funded, 
indirect provision model (arm’s length relationship between purchaser and 
provider), with a complex network of providers of different public and pri-
vate ownership formulae (Gallego and Subirats, 2012; Gallego et al., 2005). 
With the 1990 Law of Organization of Health in Catalonia, the ICS lost the 
purchasing functions it had had vis-à-vis de contracted network. Those 
functions were assigned to a newly created health authority body that would 
act under private management regulations —The Catalan Health Service 
(SCS)—, what mitigated the rest of providers’ mistrust for it being both 
purchaser and provider. Meanwhile, the ICS remained as an isolated exem-
plar of direct, public provision: a large provider of health services, with a 
single legal personality, operating under administrative law regulations. As a 
result, it was persistently seen as an isle of obsolete privilege by the con-
tracted providers, particularly in relation to the different regulation of 
labour relations (largely civil service) and financing mechanisms (budget 
allocations).
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The need to reformulate of the ICS’s legal nature, the criticisms about its 
inefficiency, and the insistence on the need to modernize its management 
tools had been permanent issues in the discourse of a large part of actors 
related to the Catalan health policy sector (politicians, managers and profes-
sionals), attracting varying degrees of attention throughout that time. How-
ever, these studies also highlight that these same actors considered that such 
changes had not been addressed over those years because: a) from a legal point 
of view, it was very difficult to change regulations from a Social Security man-
agement body form to a Publicly-Owned Enterprise or to Autonomous Body 
forms; b) the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Catalan government, 
and particularly its Intervention Unit, due to the institutional bias derived 
from its control role, opposed a management model that might involve ex 
post economic and financial control; and c) unions would probably mobilize 
a strong professional opposition if that proposal involved a change in labour 
relations. Some arguments also pointed out that a legal redefinition of the ICS 
required an injection of economic resources (to balance budgets) that could 
not be affordable by the budget of the Catalan government. 
The Catalan regional elections of November 2003 brought the first ide-
ological turnover in the Catalan government since the Spanish democratic 
transition of the late 1970s. The nationalist, center-right party coalition Con-
vergència i Unió (CiU) had ruled the Catalan government over 23 consecu-
tive years, since the first regional election in 1980, and with an absolute 
majority between 1984 and 1995. As a result of the 2003 Catalan elections a 
post-electoral centre-left coalition formed to add-up to an absolute majority 
in parliament and took office: the Party of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC), 
the independentist Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), and the eco-socialist 
coalition Initiative of Catalonia-Green (ICV), each of them representing dif-
ferent intensities of Catalan nationalist and leftist leanings.
The post-electoral agreement that was the base for the tripartite govern-
ment made an explicit political option for strengthening social policy in 
 general, and health policy in particular, with a wide support for the modern-
ization and sustainability of public services. The Minister for Health (Marina 
Geli, from PSC) appointed by the new Catalan president (Pasqual Maragall, 
from PSC) was committed to push important changes in the health arena. As 
she announced in her fist address to Parliament, during her mandate, she 
would prioritize two laws: the Decree of Health Territorial Governments, 
which was passed at the beginning of 2006; and the Law on Public Health, which 
was passed in 2009. As a reinforcing piece of the government program, Geli 
announced third law, the ICS’s Law. She said she would promote a different 
view of ICS and made her intention explicit to address the ICS’s moderni-
zation through a change in its legal nature and the improvement of its 
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management tools and autonomy, with an aim to make it closer to the way 
of operating of the contracted providers, all with an aim to ensure its sustain-
ability.
The negotiations of the ICS Law started at the beginning of 2004 and 
were extended into the following legislative period, also under the tripartite 
government, to be passed in mid-2007. This Law transformed the ICS from 
an administrative body into a public enterprise with the corresponding change 
in the public management model. The negotiations centred on four issues: 
legal personality, degree of financial autonomy, (non-)civil service status of 
health professionals, and degree of organizational unity or disaggregation. The 
result of the negotiation led to the creation of a public enterprise which would 
be committed to a permanent auditing with the Catalan Ministry of Econ-
omy. This commitment meant an increase in the existing ICS’s financial and 
accounting autonomy, but which would be lower than that usually enjoyed by 
public companies. Third, an agreement was reached with the trade unions in 
which the government would not change the employment civil service status 
of ICS’s staff. There would be the possibility of contracting new staff with 
non-civil service status, but only in certain circumstances and as an exception. 
And, finally, among the different options about organizational unity, the alter-
native chosen was transforming the ICS into a unitary public company, so its 
provider units (hospitals and primary care centres) would not have independ-
ent legal personality.
After 2010 the political map of Catalonia changed. CiU won the Cata-
lan elections again and Boi Ruiz, coming from the Catalan Union of Hospi-
tals (representing managerial interests from contracted providers) was 
appointed as the new Minister of Health of the Catalan government. Promi-
nent among the first political decisions of the new government was the Omni-
bus Law. This law meant the simultaneous modifications of a large number of 
previous laws, including the ICS’ law. Having only the support of the Popular 
Party, CiU approved mechanisms for disaggregating the ICS into its provider 
units, for offering ICS’s infrastructures for contract to private health compa-
nies, and for expanding the use of labour contracts not based on civil service 
conditions.
2.2. Andalusia: Expanding the network of Hospital Centres of High Resolution 
Since Andalusia received the competencies on health care in 1984, its 
healthcare system preserved the public, integrated, direct provision model as it 
was initially transferred by the Spanish government. In a region where at that 
time private actors did not exist in health care provision —only some religious 
entities offered charity healthcare services—, the Andalusian government 
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centralized the health care system almost exclusively to one organization: the 
Andalusian Health Service (SAS) (MSPSI 2010). This autonomous, adminis-
trative organization performed planning, contracting, and health service provi-
sion roles in the areas of both primary and hospital care. The SAS was under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health of the Andalusian government, but 
the role of the ministry was limited and its functions were not clearly differenti-
ated from those of a number of SAS departments. 
The continuation of the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party’s (PSOE) in the 
Andalusian government since the first regional elections of 1982 —occasion-
ally with an absolute majority— resulted in healthcare policy decisions that 
were supported by government majorities —and less by parliamentary con-
sensus— as well as by ideological preferences. Criticisms to the inefficiency of 
the integrated, direct public provision model were recurrent, but much linked 
to the same arguments also highlighted in the rest of regions in relation to the 
integrated model –such as, contending interpretations about the level of dis-
cretion of health professionals and managers in terms of spending, red-tape 
and managerial inefficiency. 
The consolidation of this model, though, did not prevent the regional 
government from exploring the introduction of organizational innovations 
towards the end of the decade of the 1990s (Martín, 2003; Palomo et al., 
2012). On the one hand, these innovations included individual legal person-
ification through the creation of a small number of State-owned companies 
outside SAS, and on the other hand, few punctual agreements with the few 
existing private entities —both for-profit and non-profit— for the provision 
of hospital care. In this sense, the Law on the Health of Andalusia (1998) laid the 
foundations for a possible —and future— separation of functions between 
the Department of Health and SAS. In 1999 SAS published its Strategic Plan, 
entitled “A differentiated proposal of public management” (Torrubia and 
Higuera, 2011), which recommended the introduction of clinical and admin-
istrative management strategies. During the 1990s, global changes in SAS 
were also explored but were ruled out, such as, for example, the conversion of 
the organisation into a State-owned company. However, none of these pro-
cesses at the time involved structural changes in the management of the 
healthcare system, although they did form the basis for institutional changes 
put in place at the beginning of the 2000s. 
During the first decade of the 2000s the Andalusian Health System was 
characterized by being based on a public and direct provision and having SAS 
as the main actor. However, the changes in the Andalusian public healthcare 
system during that time were numerous and diverse —including quality strat-
egy, a clinical management model, and a change in labour policy at SAS, 
among other initiatives. 
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There were also important changes in the structure of service provision 
through the network of new hospitals created by the regional government, with 
unique characteristics. This was a decentralized network of High Resolution 
Hospitals (CHAREs) that took on the legal status of State-owned companies and 
was gradually developed through the whole decade. The aim of these hospitals, 
which are smaller than SAS hospitals, was to improve access to and efficiency of 
the healthcare system. The legal status of State-owned company (and the result-
ant regulations) had been introduced originally during the 1990s but it was at 
the beginning of the 2000s that were undertaken as the preferred form for the 
expansion of service provision. Formally, these regulations remained unchanged, 
although they were interpreted and enacted in new ways. This meant the consol-
idation of the legal status developed during the 90s but not the introduction of 
changes on labour conditions of existing workers (civil servants), but the contract 
of new professionals under new conditions (labour staff). The public officials 
interviewed for this study point to this decision as the main argument for unions 
—the only organized stakeholder— to support this initiative. The government 
decided that the CHAREs would organically depend on the Department of 
Health —just like the existing State-owned companies— and not on the SAS, a 
decision that reinforced the government’s general aim of separating, at least in 
part, the functions of these two organizations. According to the top-officials 
interviewed, the decision to develop the CHAREs network under the legal status 
of State-owned companies did not involve opting for a management model dif-
ferent to the integrated SAS, but reflected the need to improve the efficiency of 
the public system. However, the Andalusian government continued to construct 
different types of hospitals that organically depended on SAS, what implies the 
search of balance between different models of provision6. 
In short, policymakers interviewed for this study conceived and justified 
the decision to develop the CHAREs network as an alternative to cooperation 
with private centres and, also, an attempt to demonstrate that private man-
agement was not more efficient than public management. The CHAREs 
 network was at the same time an opportunity to reinforce —and complete— 
the model of direct public service provision, as well as to drive changes in the 
global governance of the healthcare system.
6 At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of the State-owned 
company has become increasingly ambiguous since its introduction in Andalusia in 
the 1990s: it implies greater administrative flexibility but also allows a certain level of 
political control. In turn, after the period analyzed in this case study, the legal figure 
of public firm adopted by CHARES was transformed into public firm agency (Law 
1/2011, of Reorganization of the Andalusian Public Sector).
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V. FINANCING MODEL AND IDEOLOGY: HOW DO THEY 
INFLUENCE REGIONAL POLITICAL AUTONOMY?
After more than two decades in which Andalusia and Catalonia consoli-
dated different models of public healthcare provision, in the early 2000s, their 
governments undertook reforms in this area which again were different. Anda-
lusia boosted the CHAREs bringing public governance closer to private man-
agement instruments, but consolidated and strengthened the model of direct 
public provision of SAS. Catalonia maintained the contracted network, but 
transformed the ICS direct public provision into a public company. These 
decisions again different; do they respond to an ideological option or have 
they been conditioned or constrained by the territorial funding model? 
The period analysed in this study is part of an upward and expansive eco-
nomic cycle for both regions. Catalonia and Andalusia had the same level of 
competence in healthcare provision since the early 1980s. In the analysed 
period, the reforms of the territorial funding model of 2001 and 2009 
expanded their powers of income and expenditure and increased the volume 
of their available budgetary resources - both for those coming from the terri-
torial funding model and for those from outside the model. This allowed the 
per capita healthcare expenditure to increase exponentially until 2008 in 
Andalusia and until 2010 in Catalonia, then a descent began, linked to the 
crisis. However, until 2008, Catalonia received annually fewer resources per 
capita than Andalusia from the funding model, accentuating the difference 
until the reform of the model in 2009 reversed this situation. According to 
officials interviewed for this study, increasing available resources always facili-
tated the proposal for reforms, and, as they indicate, in both cases the pro-
posed reforms required increased resources. Throughout the decade under 
study, the relative weight of resources from the funding model to total reve-
nues of the regional government has been greater in Andalusia than in Cata-
lonia, and in both cases this weight has decreased since 2009. In the budgets, 
for 2008, allocated income taxes represented 88 % of revenues in Catalonia 
and 55 % in Andalusia, making the latter more dependent on transfers or 
grants from other levels of government. In any case, resources per capita in 
both AC were finally similar, because Catalonia resorted to financing from 
outside the model. 
The greater weight of taxes and debt implies greater responsibility in 
accountability, and it is relevant to note that, throughout the period, healthcare 
spending per capita has been higher in Catalonia than in Andalusia. Also, the 
structure of health spending reveals a policy option for different delivery models. 
In Andalusia, the remuneration of staff and intermediate consumption has 
increased from 68 % to 69 % of total spending, indicating that the weight of the 
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integrated model (direct public provision) has not changed despite the analysed 
reform. In Catalonia, the weight of the integrated model (remuneration of per-
sonnel and intermediate consumption) has increased from 42 % to 54 % of total 
health expenditure, while the weight of the model of indirect provision (private 
partnerships) has decreased from 33 % to 24 %. This indicates a strengthening of 
the direct public provision model following the reform and throughout the 
period. Therefore, budget data indicate that in both cases the reform reinforced 
the model of direct public provision, which fits with the discourse of its promot-
ers in both cases, but not with the diversification of management involving both 
the CHAREs as well as the conversion of ICS to a public company. 
The influence of the ideology factor also raises ambiguities, particularly 
regarding the link between propositional principles traditionally assigned to 
ideologies on the left-right axis, on the one hand, and the programmatic pro-
posals and government actions of the parties, on the other. During the last 
two decades of the xxth century, Andalusia was ruled by a leftist party (PSOE) 
and Catalonia by a nationalist coalition of the centre-right (CiU). This would 
strengthen the traditional bond of leftist ideology with a model of direct pub-
lic provision in an integrated structure (Andalusia) and a right-wing ideology 
with a model of indirect public provision (Catalonia). However, in early 2000, 
in Andalusia there is continuity of the PSOE in government but they under-
take reforms that involve the diversification of forms of management and dis-
tancing from the integrated model. In Catalonia, there is an ideological shift 
to the left in government (PSC-ERC-IC), but the new government does not 
question the contractual delivery network and transforms the single inte-
grated structure of the healthcare system —the ICS— into a public company, 
away from the integrated model and opening the door to disaggregation and 
indirect public provision in the ICS space.
However, if we understand ideology as a complex link between principles 
and interests expressed through a programmatic and justifying discourse of gov-
ernment action, the analysis of these cases shows that ideology has a great influ-
ence on government decisions and if the scope of government action is not well 
determined —being limited by available resources— it does determine its direc-
tion. Therefore, as seen in these two cases, reforms of healthcare management 
that choose management tools that depart from direct public provision or inte-
grated model do not necessarily imply an ideological shift to the withdrawal of 
the public sector in the provision of services, but rather that budget indicators 
can reveal the reinforcement thereof. The officials interviewed for this study 
insist in the political will for this, whether or not it be the case. Moreover, they 
explicitly insist that not only are they moving in an ideological axis of left and 
right, but also in a territorial centre-periphery axis that shows in each case pro-
jects other than identity affirmation. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The interest of this research is the impact of decentralization of States on 
the political autonomy of sub-central governments. In both academic and 
political debates on the factors that condition the policy discretion of those 
governments, there are voices that highlight the model of regional financing 
and voices that insist on the political will and the ideological orientation of 
parties in power, as alternative explanations. To explore this question, this 
article presents a study in decentralised Spain, on: Why have regional govern-
ments taken different public policy options? In what way, and to what extent, 
were their policy decisions and actions conditioned by the financing model 
and by their different ideologies? Theories on fiscal federalism and theories of 
public policy analysis have guided the analysis.
We selected the regions of Andalusia and Catalonia where, after more than 
two decades in which they consolidated different models of public healthcare 
provision, in the early 2000s, their governments undertook reforms in this area 
which again were different. Andalusia boosted the CHAREs bringing public 
governance closer to private management instruments, but consolidated and 
strengthened the model of direct public provision of SAS. Catalonia maintained 
the contracted network, but transformed the ICS direct public provision into a 
public company. Do these decisions respond to an ideological option or have 
they been conditioned or constrained by the territorial funding model? 
In a context of upward economic cycle, in 2001 the territorial financing 
model was modified so that the CA increased their resources and the eco-
nomic transfers they received from the central government for health were no 
longer earmarked. The analysis of the evolution of resources from the territo-
rial funding model shows that the model approved in 2001 always provided 
more resources per capita to Andalusia than to Catalonia and, instead, start-
ing from the agreement of 2009, this situation was reversed. Thus, while per 
capita resources from the model have been, during the years 2001-2008, 
higher in Andalusia than in Catalonia, in the end both regions end up having 
a similar volume of resources per inhabitant. Catalonia has therefore sought a 
greater share of its income from outside the model (higher debt and greater 
use of its regulatory powers over taxation) and, from 2005, health spending 
per capita in Catalonia has tended to be higher than in Andalusia. Key offi-
cials interviewed for this study agree in interpreting that the widespread 
increase in resources facilitated the reforms undertaken in both AC, that is, 
the scope of government action. In Catalonia, a reform that had been consid-
ered by actors of all ideological lines as unapproachable for more than two 
decades was undertaken, and in Andalusia, a reform that had hardly been 
considered in previous years was deployed. 
158 R. GALLEGO, N. BARBIERI, C. DE GISPERT, S. GONZÁLEZ y M. VILALTA
Revista de Estudios Políticos, 180, abril-junio (2018), pp. 131-162
Faced with the different orientation of these reforms, these sources also 
agree that, as in previous decades, the content and direction of them respond 
to the political preferences of the political forces in government. However, the 
influence of the ideological factor in these decisions does not provide conclu-
sive evidence: in Andalusia, under the continuity of the PSOE, there are 
reforms that involve the diversification of forms of management and their dis-
tancing from the integrated model —which does not fit the traditional pref-
erence of the left for the model of direct public provision that had been 
defended until then—; in Catalonia, there is an ideological shift to the left in 
the government, but the new government does not question the contractual 
provision network and transforms the single integrated structure of the health-
care system into a public company, thus moving away from the integrated 
model and opening the door to disaggregation and indirect public provision 
in that space.
These results confirm that the nature and volume of budgetary resources 
of sub-central governments determine the extent of political autonomy, but 
not its direction, which would be marked by ideological choices. However, 
these findings raise new questions. According to the theories of fiscal federal-
ism, greater weight of own resources in the budget as opposed to transfers/
grants from other governments brings a greater responsibility for accountabil-
ity towards citizens. But to what extent are citizens and public decision mak-
ers themselves aware of the degree of dependence on their resources? Finally, 
according to the political theories, right and left tend to identify with certain 
options of management models; but when the evidence does not show it to be 
so, does the management model stop being ideologically relevant? 
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ANNEX
Figure 1. Evolution of the total resources from the funding model.  
Liquidation 2002-2011
Source: The autors based on the Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, INE.
Figure 2. Evolution of total revenue in Andalusia and Catalonia.  
Liquidation 2002-2011
Source: The autors based on the Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, INE.
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Figure 3. Health public expenditure. € per inhabitant
Source: The autors based on the Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicions Sociales e Igualdad, INE.
